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BALANCING LOCAL CONCERNS
WITH CERCLA POLICIES: THE IMPORTANCE OF
PERSPECTIVE IN CONSIDERING THE APPLICATION
OF FEDERAL MANDATES
State of Missouri v. Independent PetrochemicalCorporation'
by Eric Walter

I.

INTRODUCTION
The decision in State of

Missouri v. Independent Petrochemical Corporation follows a
series of lawsuits by the United
States against Syntex (USA), Inc.,
Syntex Agribusiness, NEPACCO,
IPC, Russell Martin Bliss, and
Jerry-Russell Bliss, Inc., pursuant to
the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). 2 The aim
of this consolidated litigation,
known for limited purposes as the
Missouri Dioxin Litigation, was to
seek remedial relief and recovery of

petitioned the Court to acknowledge their rights and privileges
under the Syntex Consent Decree.
The County cited as error both the
denial of its motion to intervene and
the district court's ruling on the
construction and enforcement of the
Syntex Consent Decree.'

FACTS AND HOLDING
response costs for the release of II.
Eleven years ago, the
dioxin and other hazardous materials during the early 1970s at twenty- Environmental Protection Agency
eight sites in eastern Missouri, most ("EPA") issued a Record of
Decision ("ROD"), which found
notably Times Beach.'
Pursuant to this litigation, that a form of incineration called
the parties entered into two Consent thermal treatment would be the
Decrees which authorized the clean- most appropriate clean-up remedy
up and outlined the required safety at Times Beach and other dioxinstandards.4
St. Louis County contaminated sites in Missouri.'
("County"), which includes Times Within the ROD, the EPA anBeach, sought more stringent envi- nounced the "applicable or relevant
ronmental standards for the Syntex and appropriate .requirements"
Consent Decree and appealed to the ("ARARs") related to this clean-up
United States Court of Appeals for procedure, as required by
the Eighth Circuit.s The County CERCLA.8 Syntex, the EPA, and

'104 F.3d 159 (8th Cir. 1997).
'Id. at 160. See also City of Eureka, Missouri v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 500, 502 (Mo. E.D. 1991). CERCLA was amended by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). Hereafter, reference toCERCLA is intended to include the amendments
made by SARA.
'Independent PetrochemicalCorp., 104 F.3d at 160. For the purposes of this Note, there are two groups of defendants: the Syntex
defendants ("Syntex"), consisting of Syntex (USA), Inc. and Syntex Agribusiness; and the NEPACCO defendants ("NEPACCO"),
consisting ofNortheastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Company, Inc. (NEPACCO); NEPACCO's president, Edwin Michaels, and its
vice-president, John Lee; Independent Petrochemical Corporation (IPC); Russell Martin Bliss, the individual who actually sprayed the
dioxin-contaminated waste oil at the 26 sites in Missouri; and Jerry-Russell Bliss, Inc., Bliss' successor in liability. UnitedStates v.Bliss,
667 F. Supp. 1298, 1302 (Mo. E.D. 1987) (hereinafter, "Bliss I"). The specific roles these entities played in the contamination will be
detailed further in this Note.
'Independent PetrochemicalCorp., 104 F.3d at 160.
3
Id.
*Id.

7

Id. A "record ofdecision" is defined as the EPA's official record ofthe entire remedy or remedial action, as defined under § 101 ofCERCLA
and publicly reviewed under § 117 ofCERCLA, including the ARARs. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1995); 42 U.S.C. §9617 (1995). The actual
clean-up procedure is outlined in the National Contingency Plan. 40 C.F.R. Part 300 (1995). The Plan provides that after a hazardous site
has been identified, anEPA evaluation will determine whether remedial action is appropriate. See United States v. Denver, City and County
of, 100 F.3d 1509(10 Cir. 1996). This evaluation includes feasibility studies to identify the possible remedial alternatives. Based on those
studies, the EPA proposes the selected remedy and allows for public comment. Following this, the clean-up plan is then finalized, and the
EPA documents its remedy decision in a record of decision (ROD).
*Independent Petrochemical Corp., 104 F.3d at 160. A complete definition is provided for "Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate
Requirements" in a Directive from the EPA's Office ofSolid Waste and Emergency Response (OSWER): "'[a]pplicable' requirements are
those clean-up standards ofcontrol, and other substantive environmental protection requirements, criteria, or limitations promulgated under
federal or state law that specifically addressa hazardous substance, pollutant, contaminant, remedial action, location, or other circumstance
at a Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, andLiability Act(CERCLA)site. 'Relevant and appropriate' requirements
are those clean-up standards which, while not 'applicable' at a CERCLA site, address problems or situations sufficiently similar to those
encountered at the CERCLA site that their use is well-suited to the particular site. ARARs can be action-specific, location-specific, or
chemical-specific." OSWER, "Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund: Volume I - Human Health Evaluation Manual (Part C, Risk
Evaluation ofRemedial Alternatives)," 1991 WL 645477 (December 1991).
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the State of Missouri entered into a
Consent Decree patterned after the
ROD and its ARARs. 9 The Consent
Decree described the clean-up
procedures in five workplans, one
of which was the Thermal Treatment Workplan.' 0 The Consent
Decree also required that Syntex
apply for a Hazardous Waste
Management Permit from the EPA
and the State of Missouri to
construct and operate the incinerator."
In July 1993, a draft EPA/
Missouri Hazardous Waste Management Facility Permit was issued
to Syntex which proposed a formula
establishing the levels of dioxin and
metal emissions that would not
exceed health and environmental
laws." The Permit's risk assessment found that the clean-up could
be conducted safely using a
standard of approximately one
nanogram of dioxin per dry
standard cubic meter of air." This
effectively constituted a one in one
million chance of the most heavily
exposed person developing can-

Court rejected intervention as of
right, but permissive intervention
was effectively granted since the
County was allowed to file a brief in
opposition to Syntex's motion to
Pursuant to these
construe.22
District Court
the
proceedings,
declared that the County ordinance
did not apply to the Times Beach
project and limited the scope of the
ordinance to "control of conventional air pollutants, not including
dioxin."23 The decision meant that
the parties to the Consent Decree
were exempt from the County
ordinance's amendments.24
On appeal, the Eighth
Circuit found that the nature of
hazardous waste clean-up was not
given to continual modification,
and that such modification would
dard. '9
thwart the Congressional mandate
Syntex filed a motion for expeditious treatment of toxic
requesting clarification of obliga- sites.2 - Further, the Court held,
tions under the Consent Decree in federal law requires that ARAR's
light of the County's amended be frozen as of the date of the ROD,
ordinance.2 0 The County filed a and that the workplans revealed no
motion to intervene either as of right intent by the parties to ignore that
or permissively.2'
The District proposition. 6 The Eighth Circuit

cer.14

In February 1995, shortly
after the hearings concerning the
draft Permit, the St. Louis County
Council voted to amend its Air
Pollution Control Code."
The
amendments raised the air emissions permit standards for any
incinerator intended to burn known
concentrations of dioxin.' 6 The
only incinerator in St. Louis County
subject to the new standard was the
incinerator at Times Beach." The
new standard was approximately
six times more restrictive than that
approved by the EPA and the State
of Missouri."' Despite this new
requirement, the final EPA/Missouri Permit, issued two months
after the County ordinance was
passed, retained the original stan-

9

IndependentPetrochemicalCorp., 104 F.3d at 160.
10 Id.

" Id. Although in no way required to do so under § 121 (eX 1)ofCERCLA, Syntex agreed in the Consent Decree to apply for air, water and
hazardous waste permits to construct and operate the thermal treatment unit, including a St. Louis County Department of Health air
construction/operating permit. Id. at 162. The County bases its argument that Syntex must comply with the County's new ordinance on this
clause. Id.
"1Id.at 161. (The determination of the appropriate level of emissions was based on a site-specific Times Beach Risk Assessment of this
incineration project.)
Id.

1

"Id. (The decision offered no information on why one nanogram ofdioxin per dry standard cubic meter ofair equated with the project being
conducted "safely." It only stated the fact in a conclusory manner, that "safely" was the standard the EPA and the State ofMissouri defined
as creating a one in a million chance of the most heavily exposed person developing cancer.)
" Id.
1 Id.
" Id.
19Id.
20

21

Id.

22

Id. (The decision did not explain why the motion to intervene as ofright was rejected by the district court. The Court only explained that
whatever the reason, an error would have been harmless given the fact that the County had the opportunity to present its position regarding
Syntex's motion to construe and effectively was heard.)
2

Id.

24

I

2

2

Id. at 162. See also 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(1XiiXBX I); 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8757 (1990).
Independent PetrochemicalCorp., 104 F.3d at 162.
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held that due to the federal entists have generally agreed that
government's involvement in the human data is too limited, leading
project, the County's amended them only to conclude that dioxin is
ordinance was inconsistent with a "probable" human carcinogen
federal law and thus, inapplicable to under some conditions of expothe Times Beach project.
sure.33
Despite the scientific unIII.
LEGAL BACKcertainty surrounding dioxin's harmGROUND
ful effects, the EPA elected to
Dioxin is a unique and regulate dioxin emissions to protect
harmful substance and has been the human health and the environsubject of extensive study and ment. 34 Critics of these regulations
research.28
A by-product of have argued that the stringent rules
combustion and other industrial are overly cautious, while others
processes, its physical and chemical have sought more restrictive regulaproperties predispose dioxin to tion.35 In addition, supporters of
exist primarily in soil, sediments, increased regulation suggest the
and living things.2 9 Studies have elimination of all chlorinated orshown dioxin to be one of the most ganic compounds that do not
potent animal carcinogens ever readily degrade into harmless
tested.30 While dioxin's effects substances.36 For the time being, the
vary depending on the particular EPA is awaiting new scientific
strain of the chemical, there are evidence before modifying its
effects common to most forms.3 1 dioxin regulations."
UnfortuExperimental exposure to low nately, the EPA's regulations came
concentrations of common dioxins too late for some communities that
has produced varying degrees of were knowingly exposed to dioxin.
cancer, adverse effects on immune
and male reproductive systems, and A.
Factual Background
most commonly, chloracne. 32 SciHoffman-Taff, Inc.,

chemical company located in
Verona, Missouri, manufactured
Agent Orange for the Vietnam War
effort in the late 1960s." A dioxinladen residue, which the plant
stored in large drums, was a byproduct of the process used to
manufacture Agent Orange.39
Syntex, Inc., acquired the rights and
liabilities of Hoffinan-Taff, effective December 31, 1968, and
subsequently transferred those interests to Syntex Agribusiness.40 In
the early 1970's, Northeastern
Pharmaceutical and Chemical Company ("NEPACCO") moved into
the Verona plant and began manufacturing trichlorophenal ("TCP"),
which also produced dioxin as a byproduct. This additional dioxin was
added to the waste left by HoffmanTaff."
NEPACCO sought to
these wastes, so it
of
dispose
retained Independent Petrochemical Corporation (IPC).42
Ultimately, IPC hired Russell Bliss to
perform the disposal, which Bliss
did by mixing the by-products with
waste oil and other substances and
spraying the mixture at a number of

" Id.
2
Linda-Jo Schierow, Dioxin: Reassessingthe Risk, 7 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENVIRONMENT 7, 8 (1996). See
also William B. Johnson,
Liability Under § 7003 ofResource ConservationandRecovery Act Pertainingto Imminent Hazardsfrom Solid or Hazardous Waste,
115 AMERICAN LAw REPORTS FEDERAL 491 (1993).
29
Schierow,supra note 28, at 8.
*0Id. UnitedStates v. Vertac Chemical Corporation,10 ENVTL. L. REP. 20709 (1980). Experiments which involved painting a dioxin
mixture on mice caused tumors to appear on the animals' skin. See Environmental Protection Agency, Chemical,Physical,andBiological
PropertiesofCompounds Present at Hazardous Waste Sites, 1985 WL 263592 (1985).
3n Id. at 630.
n Id. Chloracne is a severe skin disorder marked by painful symptoms that can persist for long periods of time. Jamon A. Jarvis, Note, The
DiscretionaryFunctionException and the Failureto Warn ofEnvironmentalHazards: Taking the "Protection"Out ofEnvironmental
ProtectionAgency, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 543 (1993). Extreme cases can lead to the development of disfiguring lesions. Arnold W. Reitze,
Jr. & Andrew N. Davis, Comment, RegulatingMunicipalSolid Waste IncineratorsUnderthe CleanAir Act: History, Technology and
Risks, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (1993).
3 Schierow, supra note 28, at 8.
3 Id. at 9.
3

6

Id.

Id.

37Id

" United States v. Bliss, 133 F.R.D. 559, 561 (Mo. E.D. 1990) (hereinafter, "Bliss HI").
39

Id.

40Id

41

Id.

42Id

62
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sites in eastern Missouri.
Health concerns over dioxin and TCP contamination have
been warranted at twenty-eight sites
due to this spraying.44 The EPA has
in fact determined that several of
these sites, most prominently Times
Beach, contain levels that create a
potentially imminent and substantial danger. 45 The result has been a
series of consolidated litigation to
resolve liability and determine the
appropriate method of clean-up.'
B.

Litigation
Aside from insurance liability cases and personal indemnity suits, there have been four
significant cases stemming from the
factual situation outlined above.
The first case involving the dioxin
contamination of Times Beach was
aimed at establishing primary
liability for the environmental
damage.48
In United States v. Bliss
("Bliss I"), the United States sought
a determination of liability against

NEPACCO under section 107 of
CERCLA for damage to natural
resources and expenses associated
with response costs and remedial
action. 4 9 The government motioned
for summary judgment against each
defendant for the contamination
resulting from their common interest in disposing of the Verona plant
by-products, arguing that the fact
that Bliss physically sprayed the
dioxin mixture did not excuse the

intent is not an issue." The three
defenses to CERCLA liability are:
(1) an act of God; (2) an act of war;
or (3) an act or omission of a third
party.s" Since the defendants failed
to present any evidence supporting
any one of the defenses, and the
government successfully established
a prima facie case of CERCLA
contamination, the District Court
found NEPACCO jointly and
severally liable.54
other defendants.50
In United States v. Bliss
Prima facie liability under ("Bliss II"), the United States
CERCLA requires four elements: District Court for the Eastern
(1) each of the sites is a "facility"; District of Missouri heard motions
(2) a "release" or a "threatened by the cities of Eureka and Fenton
release" of a "hazardous substance" (the Cities) to intervene and file
from the sites has occurred or is complaints against Syntex and
occurring; (3) the release or NEPACCO.ss The Cities sought
threatened release has caused the intervention to express their conUnited States to incur response cern over the possible adverse
costs; and (4) the defendants fall effects of using nearby Times
within at least one of the classes of Beach as a locus for the area's
liable persons described by sections dioxin clean-up.-6
The Court
107(a)(1)-(a)(4).s' Since CERCLA determined that the relevant reprovides for strict liability, a quirements for intervention as of
defendant's prior knowledge or right were listed in 42 U.S.C. §

4

1Id. During the early 1970's, Bliss was receiving oil from over a thousand sources, primarily crankcase oil from service stations. Oil was
placed into and drained from two large storage tanks at Bliss' facility in Frontenac, Missouri on a daily basis. Most ofthe oil was loaded
onto tanker trucks and taken to oil refineries, but some was sprayed at the contaminated sites for dust suppression. Bliss 1, 667 F. Supp. at
1303 (Mo. E.D. 1987).
" Bliss III, 133 F.R.D. at 561.
4

Id.

"Id.
4
SeegenerallyBlissI, 667 F. Supp. 1298 (Mo. E.D. I987, United States v. Bliss, 132 F.R.D. 58 (Mo. E.D. 1990) (hereinafter, "Bliss II");
Bliss I, 133 F.R.D. 559 (Mo. E.D. 1990); City of Eureka v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 500 (Mo. E.D. 1991).
4 Bliss 1, 667 F. Supp. at 1302.
49 Id. at 1304. Section 107 ofCERCLA is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
so Bliss 1, 667 F. Supp. at 1303.
Id. at 1304. A "facility" is defined as "(A) any building, structure,...pipe,...pond,...vehicle,...or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a
hazardous substance has been deposited, stored,...or otherwise comes to be located." 42 U.S.C. §9601(9). CERCLA defines a "release"
as "any spilling, leaking, pumping,.. .dumping, or disposing into the environment [any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant]
(with exceptions). See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22). A "hazardous substance" is defined in § 101 of CERCLA as including toxic pollutants,
hazardous air pollutants, and hazardous chemical substances or mixtures. For a complete and detailed listing, see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)
5
Bliss 1, 667 F. Supp at 1304.
3

d.

Id
-5 Bliss II, 132 F.R.D. 58 (Mo. E.D. 1990). (Eureka is approximately two miles from Times Beach and Fenton is located within ten miles
of Times Beach.)
56 Id. at 59.
54
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9613(i) (CERCLA) and subject to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
24." Regarding the timeliness of
the application, the Court found that
the Cities' application was untimely
in light of the broad media coverage
and considerable pendency of the
consolidated cases."s The Court
found it was unreasonable to
believe the Cities were unaware of
the significance of the case or the
prior opportunities to be heard on
the issues. 59
The Court ruled that the
Cities need not achieve party status
to have their interests represented.6o
The Court further concluded that
workplans contained in the Consent
Decree, which included the EPA's
recommendation of Times Beach as
the center of the clean-up effort,
would be published, and any
interested party, including the
Cities, would have an opportunity
to submit written comments to the
Department of Justice.6' In addi-

tion, the Court stated, government
entities exist to act in the public
interest, so there was a presumption
that Missouri and the United States
were adequately representing the
Cities' interests.62 The Court held
that this presumption, along with
the available forms of public
participation, sufficiently protected
the Cities. Moreover, had these
parties failed to adequately represent the Cities' interests, the Court
stated that it could have permitied
intervention upon a showing of bad
faith or malfeasance on the part of
the government entities."
United States

v.

Bliss

("Bliss III"), involved the District

Court's review of the two Consent
Decrees, one signed by Syntex and
the other by NEPACCO. 6s The
proposed Consent Decrees, if
approved by the Court and the
parties, would have resolved all
pending issues in the consolidated
cases concerning the Syntex and

NEPACCO defendants."
The
Court praised the Syntex Consent
Decree and the workplans contained within it as exhaustive,
detailed, and commendable.6 ' The
public, on the other hand, submitted
comments on the Consent Decrees
which indicated a profound concern
for potential hazards, such as
contaminated smoke emanating
from the incinerator or flood waters
carrying dioxin to other areas in
Missouri and possibly farther.'
After reviewing the provisions
regarding Times Beach and the
thermal incinerator, the Court
indicated that it believed the
public's sentiments were the product of unfounded anxiety.'
In
particular, the Court noted the
explicit timetable, and the sizable
penalties associated with failure to
adhere to the specifications of the
Consent Decrees.7 0
The NEPACCO Consent
Decree provided that the defendants

" Id. The elements under these statutes require a potential intervenor to: "(1) make a timely application for intervention; (2) have an interest
in the subject of the action; (3) be so situated that without intervention, the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or
impede the applicant's ability to protect this interest, and; (4) have an interest not adequately protected by existing parties." 42 U.S.C. §
9613(i).
"'BlissII, 132 F.R.D. at 60. At the time ofthe trial, the EPA's Record ofDecision was almost two years old and the Cities had participated
in many of the state and federal processes addressing both the dioxin problem and its litigation. Inaddition, since the town ofTimes Beach
was forced to evacuate due to the contamination, this factual situation had been a topic of media coverage for several years. Id.
"9Id. To illustrate one such opportunity, the Director ofthe Department ofNatural Resources discussed intervention with the Cities' counsel,
who advised that the Cities were not interested in intervention. Id.
60 Id.
61Id.
62 Id.

6

1 d. at 61.

I Id. The Eight Circuit has applied this standard, as promulgated by the Supreme Court: "[biad faith or malfeasance on the part of the
Government in negotiating and accepting a consent decree must be shown before intervention will be allowed." United States v. Associated
Milk Producers, 534 F.2d 113,117 (8th Cir. 1976) (quoting Sam Pox Publishing Co. V. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 689 (1961). See also
United States v. Hooker Chemicals &Plastics, 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984), an enforcement action in which the government sued as "paren
patriae." The Court of Appeals found that, "it is proper to require a strong showing of inadequate representation before permitting
intervenors to disrupt the government's exclusive control over the course of its litigation." Id. at 987.
6 Bliss III, 133 F.R.D. at 559. At the time these were signed, no liability had attached to Syntex. Id. at 562.
" Id., at 562.
7
Id.
"Id. at 563. Times Beach is located in the five-year flood plain ofthe Meremac River. The Consent Decree required the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers to erect a ring levee around the incinerator three feet higher than the 100 year flood height.
" Bliss III, 133 F.R.D. at 563.
oId. The Court also pointed out the logic inselecting Times Beach as the site of the incinerator. Not only is "Times Beach the largest of
the twenty-eight sites in both geographic size and volume of contaminated waste," it would not be feasible tobuildan incinerator at each site.
Some of the sites would not be large enough to house such a facility. Also, Times Beach is a logical choice because it has already been
evacuated. Id. at 564.
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would pay the plaintiffs $225,000.00
within thirty days of the entry of the
Consent Decree." This payment
acted in discharge ofthe NEPACCO
defendants' entire liability for the
incident.7 2 Part IV of the Consent
Decree protected NEPACCO with a
discretionary covenant not to sue,
but also included a means to reopen
the case should new information
reveal the need for further remedial
action to protect human health,
welfare, and the environment."
Finally, the Court explored
the legal standards governing entry
of Consent Decrees and made
findings of fact and conclusions of
law.7 4 The Court has discretion in
approving a consent decree, but that
discretion is limited, in that rejection must be due to "unfairness,
inadequacy, or unreasonableness.""
The judge should be concerned only
with the adequate protection of the
parties and the public, not the
optimal terms of settlement. 6
In determining whether a
71

consent decree should be approved,
the Court applied a rubric first
offered by the First Circuit." The
rubric's four elements are (1)
procedural fairness, (2) substantive
fairness, (3) reasonableness, and (4)
fidelity to the statute."'
An
evidentiary hearing on the suitability of a consent decree was
available, but as the First Circuit
noted, courtrooms are busy, and a
hearing should be held only when
oral argument is necessary.' 9
The Court found that no
evidentiary hearing would be necessary because all relevant issues were
fully argued and thoroughly
briefed. 0 Specifically, each of the
four elements of the rubric indicated that the Consent Decree
should be approved and entered.'
The successful application of the
rubric and the Court's perception of
the facts and Consent Decrees
compelled the judge to grant the
joint motion of the United States
and Missouri to enter the Consent

Decrees between those government
entities and the Syntex and
NEPACCO defendants."
Finally, nearly eight months
after the decision in Bliss III , the
cities of Eureka and Fenton,
Missouri, brought an action to
challenge the EPA's selection of a
remedial action plan prior to the
plan's implementation.'
The
defendants, the United States and
the EPA, moved to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction."
They argued that under 11 3(h)(4) of
CERCLA, no affirmative challenges to an EPA response action
plan could be made prior to
implementation, effectively removing the case from the limited
jurisdiction of the federal courts."
The Court began by reviewing the thorough and public
procedure employed by the EPA to
arrive at its clean-up decision. 6
Pursuant to these efforts, the EPA
issued a ROD recommending
centralized thermal treatment of

Id. at 566.

72 Id.
7

Id. The opinion also included comments from non-settling defendants. This group includes Independent Petrochemical Company,
American National Can Company, and Primerica Corporation. They argued that the Syntex Consent Decree left too much liability on them,
recommended ultraconservative clean-up procedures, and was not consistent with the National Contingency Plan. Id. at 566-67. (This
portion of the decision is not relevant here).
I Bliss III, 133 F.R.D. at 567.
7

1Id. The Ninth Circuit provided in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Randolph that: "[tihe initial decision to approve or reject a
settlement proposal is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge... Unless a consent decree is unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable,
it ought to be approved." Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529 (91 Cir. 1982).
76
Bliss III, 133 F.R.D. at 567.
n Id. at 568 (citing United States v. Cannons Engineering Corp., 899 F.2d 79(1 Cir. 1990)).

" Cannons Engineering Corp., 899 F.2d at 86-93.

9Bliss III, 133 F.R.D. at 568.
0Id. at 569.

"IId. The Court found that negotiations between all the parties had been characterized by arm's length relations and good faith.
Consequently, procedural fairness was accomplished. Substantive fairness was a more difficult element to meet. The Court determined,
though, that the consent decree "falls along the broad spectrum of plausible approximations," so it should not be judicially disturbed or
second-guessed. Id. Next, the Court held that not only the cost apportionment, but also the clean-up procedure and workplans sufficiently
satisfied the element ofreasonableness. Finally, fidelity to CERCLA was evident in the appropriate obligation ofthe settling defendants and
the accountability of the responsible parties for their environmental misdeeds. Id. at 570.
8 Id.

* City ofEureka, 770 F. Supp. at 501. The plaintiffs acted under section 310 of CERCLA. Id.
1 Id. The motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is Rule 12(bX1) of the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure.
U

City ofEureka, 770 F. Supp. at 501.

Id. The EPA's efforts began in 1982. Id. The EPA conducted feasibility studies on both Times Beach and an area known as the Minker/
Stout/Romaine Creek site. Id. These studies were released independently to the public and comments were received for periods of several
months. Id. In addition, public meetings were held where interested citizens could offer viewpoints and have concerns addressed. Id. Only
after all these activities were concluded, and the comments considered and responded to, did the EPA select a remedy for the ROD. Id.
6
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contaminated soils at the temporary
facility at Times Beach." The ROD
formed the basis of the plaintiffs'
challenge. 8
The United States argued
that CERCLA completely prohibited pre-enforcement or pre-implementation review of remedial
actions taken by the EPA pursuant
to CERCLA." Consequently, the
defendant contended that the plaintiffs' claims were premature.90 The
Court found for the United States,
stating that federal judicial review
was not available when the remedial
plan was chosen but had not been
"taken" or "secured". 91 The Court
concluded that the opinions supporting the plaintiffs argument
were inconsistent and not on point,
and dismissed the claim for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.92

great deal of litigation regarding
whether control of remedial selection is vested in the federal, state, or
local government, or some combination thereof.9 3 Section 121(d)(2)
of CERCLA outlines the level of
input and control granted to the
states in this process.94 Any state
standard that is more stringent than
the federal standard, and which a
state has identified to the President
in a timely manner, is legally
applicable or relevant and appropriate under the circumstances of the
release or threatened release.95 By
the conclusion of the remedial
action, the level of control for the
hazardous substance must be equal
to or greater than the state
standard.96
However, the state's role in
the remedial selection is not
immutable.97
Subsection (d)(4)
C.
Federal Preemption
grants the President the power to
The existence of CERCLA violate subsection (d)(2) if the
and other federal hazardous waste President finds one of six circumor pollution regulations has led to a stances to exist.9" Examples of such
87

circumstances a greater risk of
human health resulting from compliance with the state standards, and
the technical impracticability of
compliance with the state standards
from an engineering perspective.99
In the event the President finds one
of these circumstances to exist, the
state standards and requirements
may be disregarded.'"
The state does have another
avenue of relief for enforcement of
its standards.' 0' If the President
proposes a remedial action plan
inconsistent with state regulations,
the proposal must toll thirty days
before it can be entered into a
consent decree.'02 This thirty day
grace period allows the state to
decide whether to concur in the
selection. 03 If the state concurs, the
state has the opportunity to become
a signatory to the consent decree.10
Should the state elect to not
concur in the President's selection,
preferring a remedial action plan
conforming to its own standards,

Id.

* Id. at 502. This action was in response to the unsuccessful attempt by the parties to intervene on an earlier action for the purpose of
challenging the ROD's approval by the court. Id. The judge in that action denied the parties on both their initial motion and on
reconsideration. Id.; See also Bliss II, 132 F.R.D. 58 (Mo. E.D. 1990).
" City ofEureka, 770 F. Supp. at 502. The defendants offered a wealth of case law in support of their contention that section 11 3(hX4) of
CERCLA explicitly prohibits pre-implementation review of such remedial actions. Id.
9 Id.

"Id. Section 113(h) ofCERCLA reads in relevant part: "No Federal court shall havejurisdiction under Federal law...to review challenges
to removal or remedial action selected... except... (4) An action under section 159 alleging that the removal or remedial action taken under
section 104 or secured under section 106 of CERCLA was in violation of any requirement ofthis chapter. Such an action may not be brought
with regard to a removal where a remedial action is to be undertaken at the site." Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).
' City ofEureka, 770 F. Supp. at 503.

"See generally City and County ofDenver, 100 F.3d 1509 (10th Cir. 1996); IdylwoodsAssociates v.MaderCapital, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 1290
(W.D.N.Y. 1996); Chatham Steel Corp. v.Brown, 858 F. Supp. 1130 (N.D. Fla. 1994).
'42 U.S.C. § 9621 (1995). Interestingly, the statute does not mention anymeasuresofcontrol applicable to governmental entities besides
the state level. Evidently, the Congressional intent was to exclude county and municipal laws to achieve efficiency. As the instant decision
mentions, these smaller governmental units can petition their state to represent their wishes. hadependentPetrochemical Corp., 104 F.3d
at 159 (8th Cir. 1997).
"42 U.S.C. § 9621(dX2XA).
"Id.

"42 U.S.C. § 9621(dX4).
*Id.

"Id. For a complete list ofthe six situations in which the President may ignore state standards in selection of remedial action, see 42 U.S.C.

§962l(dX4XA)-(F).
10Id

o'42 U.S.C. § 9621(f).
"42 U.S.C. § 9621(fX2XA).
1A Id.
104Id.
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the state has two choices.o

One provision protecting the state law.'"
option is intervention as a matter of
Generally, the rule is that if
right, in which the state could the federal law does not have clear,
attempt to show that the President's preemptive language, the court
findings were not supported by must consider whether Congress
substantial evidence"5 6 If the court intended to preempt state law."10
rules for the state, the remedial Courts have ruled, "an intent can be
action shall be modified to conform found where the scheme of federal
with the state's standards, and the regulation is so pervasive that it is
state may become a signatory to the reasonable to assume that Congress
decree.' 0' If the court determines has left no room for supplementathat the remedial action need not tion by the states.""' In Witco
conform to the state's standards, the Corporation v. Beekhuis, the Delastate can choose to pay the ware District Court faced a preempadditional costs necessary to com- tion issue.1 2 Delaware had a state
ply with the state's standards, in non-claim statute, requiring that
which case the state shall become a claims against a decedent's estate be
signatory to the decree."
made within eight months of the
There have been many decedent's death." 3 On the other
cases litigated on interpretation of hand, CERCLA provides that
this facet of CERCLA. Primarily, claims for contribution may be
the dispute has revolved around made for three years after the date of
whether federal law preempts the the judgment or judicially approved
state law, absent some statutory settlement." 4
1o542 U.S.C.
0 Id.
"0Id.

Federal courts have found
in many cases that Congress, in
enacting CERCLA, did not intend
to explicitly preempt all state
environmental law."s In addition,
these courts have agreed that
CERCLA is not so comprehensive
as to preclude supplementation by
the states."'6
However, it is
undisputed that federal law preempts any conflicting state law."'
Thus, the Witco Court found two
relevant inquiries regarding pre(1) Is it possible to
emption:
comply with both laws?; and (2)
does state law stand as an obstacle
to the intent of Congress?."'
Regarding the first question, the Delaware court found that
it was possible to comply with both
statutes." 9 This could be accomplished by giving the estate notice
of a contingent claim and filing a
contribution action within the three

§ 9621(f)X2XB).

log Id.

"See IndependentPetrochenicalCorp., 104 F.3d at 159; Witco Corp. v. Beekhuis, 822 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Del. 1993). In United States

v. Akzo Coating ofAmerica, Inc., the Court provided three instances when preemption can occur, stating: "(1) When Congress, while acting
within constitutional limits, preempts state law by stating so in express terms; (2) When the federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive
to make it reasonable to infer that Congress left no room for supplementary state regulation; and (3) In areas where Congress has not
completely displaced state regulation, federal law may preempt state law to the extent that the state law actually conflicts with the federal
law." United States v. Akzo Coating ofAmerica, Inc., 949 F.2d 1409(6* Cir. 1991). The first situation is commonly referred to as "express
preemption," while the second is known as "field preemption." City and County ofDenver, 100 F.3d at 1509. In City andCountyofDenver,
the Court noted a fourth example of preemption, "conflict preemption," which occurs where it is impossible to comply with both the federal
and state laws, or the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress's objectives. Id.
"oSee Witco, 822 F. Supp. at 1084; Akzo Coating ofAmerica, Inc., 949 F.2d at 1409.
' Witco, 822 F. Supp. at 1088.

12Id.
"1Id. at 1087. The statute, 12 Del. C. §2102, states in relevant part: "All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death
ofthe decedent.. whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort or other legal
basis... are barred against the estate, the personal representative and the heirs and devisees ofthe decedent unless presented as provided in
§2104 ofthis title within eight (8)months ofthe decedent's death whether or not the notice referred to in §2101 ofthis title have been given."
Id.

"1Id. at 1088. CERCLA § 11 3(gX3) provides in pertinent part: "No action for contribution for any response costs or damages may be
commenced more than three (3) years after... (A) the date ofjudgment in any action under this Act for recovery of such costs or damages,
or.. .(B) the date of .. entry ofajudicially approved settlement with respect to such costs or damages." 42 U.S.C. § 9613(gX3) (1995).
115Witco, 822 F. Supp. at 1088.

"'Id.

"'Id. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI,cl. 2; State Department ofHealth v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1994). Preemption is deemed to exist (1)
when compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, or (2) where state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. Witco, 822 F. Supp. at 1088.
"' Witco, 822 F. Supp. at 1088.
It9Id.
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year limitation provided in
CERCLA.120
For the second
question, the Court found that the
state statute did stand as an obstacle
to the intent of Congress, in that one
of the policies behind the federal
law is to force responsible parties to
bear the cost and obligation for
remedying the harmful conditions
they created.' 2' Moreover, two
district courts have held that state
non-claim statutes stand as an
obstacle to Congress' intent in
enacting CERCLA.122
The Witco Court rejected

these prior decisions and found that
CERCLA does not preempt state
law in this area.'23 First, since the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
govern CERCLA, the Court found
that Rule 17(b) gives the states the
exclusive power to pass laws
relating to the capacity of a person
to sue or be sued.12 4 Therefore, state
capacity statutes, like the Delaware
non-claim statute, may not be
preempted by CERCLA.12s
A second argument against
preemption involved the probate

nature of the Witco case. 2 6 Obviously, a deceased person would not
experience the same deterrent effect
and sense of responsibility for
environmental damage.' 27 In addition, states have traditionally had a
strong interest in the prompt
settlement of its residents' estates.'3 8 Thus, the Court found that
since Witco knew it was being
investigated as a potentially responsible party before the decedent
passed, the corporation could have
notified the Beekhuis estate of
Witco's contingent CERCLA contribution claim. 2 1 Witco's failure
to do so did not change the Court's
finding that the non-claim statute
was the true barrier to CERCLA
preemption. 3 0
Witco is a rare case, in that

state law prevailed over federal law.
In most cases, the result is similar to
the one in United States v. City and
County of Denver."'
In that

decision, the EPA and the Colorado
Department of Health (CDH)
issued a proposed remediation plan
for a site known as OU-VIII, which

identified excavation and replacement of contaminated soils as the
preferred alternative.'3 2 However,
the plan also encouraged public
comment on all seven feasible
alternatives.' 3
Following this
input, the EPA and CDH issued a
ROD reflecting the public support
for on-site solidification of the
contaminated soils. 13 4
However, when the responsible party attempted to begin the
on-site remedy, Denver issued a
cease and desist order based on
asserted violations of the city's
zoning ordinances. 3 s After negotiations with Denver failed, the
United States sought a declaratory
judgment finding the cease and
desist order void and unenforceable.'36 The district court granted
the United States' motion for
summary judgment based on the
Supremacy Clause. 13' Among the
possible forms of preemption, the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit found that the instant
variation was "conflict" preemption. 3 As Denver conceded, the

120
ld.
121Id. at 1088-89.
I Id. at 1089. Essentially, these cases held that to the extent state law purports to release responsible parties from liability for releasing
hazardous wastes into the environment, CERCLA preempts state law.
"nWitco, 822 F. Supp. at 1089.
124Id.

'2 Id.
26
Id. at 1090.
127Id.

12s Id.
129Id. at 1091.

' Id.
"' 100 F.3d 1509 (10" Cir. 1996).
'2 Id. at 1511. The contamination in Denver was the result ofexposure to radioactive waste in the early 1900's. Id. The entire Superfund
site was divided into eleven operable units comprising over forty locations. Id. The site at issue, known as OU-VIII, consists ofthree parcels,
the largestofwhich is the only privately-owned unit in the entire Superfund site. Id. It is owned by S.W. Shattuck Chemical Company, the
responsible party. Id.
1' Id.
1"Id. Denver expressed support for excavation and replacement, but did not claim that onsite remediation would violate its zoning
ordinances. Id. at 1512.
US Id. The zoning ordinances prohibit the maintenance of hazardous waste in areas zoned for industrial use. Id.
' Id.
u7 Id. The Court noted that its review ofthis decision was de novo, and applied the standard that, "Summaryjudgment is appropriate if 'there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and...the moving party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law."' Id. See also FED. R. Civ.
P. 56(c).
"nCity and County ofDenver, 100 F.3d at 1512. See also Witco. 822 F. Supp. at 1088, for discussion of the forms of preemption.
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responsible party could not possibly
comply with both the local zoning
ordinances and the EPA's remedial
order.'3
Denver offered two
arguments against preemption. 40
First, Denver suggested
that Congress did not intend to
preempt local zoning ordinances.' 4 '
Its argument was that since CERCLA
includes an express preemption in
section 121, Congress would have
expressly provided for any other
appropriate means of preemption.' 4 2 Denver claimed that a
Supreme Court case, Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., stood for the
proposition that an implied preemption cannot exist where Congress
has included an express preemption
elsewhere in the statute. 43
The Tenth. Circuit found
Denver's interpretation of Cipollone
erroneous. 44 The Court's reading
was that implied preemption is
precluded by an express preemption
clause only if that clause offers a
"reliable indicium of congressional
intent with respect to state authority".' 4 1 In fact, the Court found two
federal cases stating that an express
preemption provision does not
necessarily preclude the possibility

of implied preemption or an
analysis for its presence.146 Consequently, the Court found that the
express preemption clause in section 121 did not qualify as a
sufficiently reliable indicium of
Congress's intent.'4 Moreover, the
Court suggested that a contrary
holding would conflict with
CERCLA's policy goal of prompt
and efficient clean-up of hazardous
waste sites.' 4
Second, Denver argued that
its zoning ordinances constituted "a
state environmental or facility siting
law." 4 9 If this had been the case, the
ordinance would have fallen within
the definition of "applicable or
relevant and appropriate requirements" of state law, requirements
which the EPA must comply with
when the state requirements are
more restrictive than the federal
standards.'" Denver reached this
conclusion relying on Wisconsin
Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, a
Supreme Court case finding that the
use of the term "state" in a portion
of a federal statute included
"political subdivisions" of the
state. 5'
The circuit court decided

that Mortier did not apply in this
situation because it would produce a
result contrary to the policy
objectives and legislative history of
CERCLA.s 2 The Court based its
holding on the fact that the
applicable federal statute inMortier,
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA'),
unlike CERCLA, did not emphasize in its legislative history the
prompt and efficient remediation
attending issues relating to public
health.'1 3 Essentially, the decision
held that had Congress intended to
define "state law" as including local
zoning ordinances, it would have
expressly done so, and thus, the
ordinances were preempted.'s 4
These cases provide examples of the interplay and relationship between federal law and state
and local laws. As Witco demonstrates, federal law does not always
supersede state and local law.
However, the Supremacy Clause
dictates that federal law will usually
preempt state and local law, as

evidenced by City and County of
Denver and the instant decision.

City and County ofDenver, 100 F.3d at 1512.

oId. at 1513.

41

'4

Id.

Id. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).

'"City and County ofDenver, 100 F.3d at 1513.
15Id.

'6Id. See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995), Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir. 1996).
141

City and County ofDenver, 100 F.3d at 1513.

18Id.
19Id.

"'Id. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenorv. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597(1991). The statute at issue inMorrierwas the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 -13 6(y) (1995).
"ICity and County ofDenver, 100 F.3d at 1513.
153Id.

"1Id. The remainder of this decision regards Denver's challenges to the EPA's chosen remedy. Id. The Tenth Circuit rejected these
challenges on the basis of§ 113 ofCERCLA, which provides that no federal court shall havejurisdiction toreviewany challenges to removal
or remedial action selected by the EPA under § 104 or §106(a) ofCERCLA. Id. at 1514. There are five exceptions to this provision, but
Denver did not argue that any are applicable to these facts. Id. The Congressional policy behind § 113 is to prevent protracted litigation

interfering with CERCLA's overall goal ofeffecting the prompt clean-up of hazardous waste sites. Id.
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IV.

INSTANT DECISION

The District Court's denial
of the County's motion to intervene
as a matter of right was not given
formal treatment by the Eighth
ration for the United States Court of Circuit.' 6' The Appellate Court
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.'
ruled that even if the District Court
As a threshold matter, Judge Ross erred in denying the motion, it was
set out the applicable standards of harmless error, not reversible error,
review.'"
When reviewing the since the lower court allowed the
district court's interpretation of a County to present its arguments
consent decree, the appellate court regarding Syntex's motion to conwill apply Missouri's rules of strue.'" Thus, the County was
contract interpretation."' The court heard and had no cause to
will exercise de novo review if the complain.' 6s
interpretation is based entirely on
The County's primary arthe written instrument.'58 If the gument was that the parties to the
interpretation is also based on Consent Decree agreed that Syntex
extrinsic evidence, however, the would be required to obtain a
court will apply clearly erroneous county permit.'" Under section
standard.' The court noted that a 121(e)(1) of CERCLA, federal law
consent decree is a unique form of does not require a local permit for
law, a private agreement between any onsite removal or remediation
parties subject to the interpretation action.'16
However, Syntex did
of the court.'" Consequently, a agree to obtain the necessary waste
court interpreting a consent decree permits to construct and operate the
must consider the context in which Thermal Treatment Unit.'" Under
the decree was signed.' 6'
The the agreement, the County claimed
Eighth Circuit noted that the authority to impose their more
District Court that entered the restrictive air emissions standards.169
decree had a superior perspective,
The District Court found
stating that the District Court's that the County's argument was
interpretation would receive defer- well-supported by the Consent
ence.162
Decree, except that federal law

Circuit Judge Ross wrote
the opinion in State of Missouri v.
IndependentPetrochemical Corpo-

.ss
Independent Petrochemical Corp., 104 F.3 at 160.
1 Id.
'57 Id.

'

58

Id.
"' Id.
u6Id. at 162.
1ai1d.
"6Id.
12 Id.
"6 Id.
"' Id.
"' Id.
168Id.
"' Id.

169Id.
170Id.
171Id.
172Id.
174Id.
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mandates that all related ARARs
are "frozen" as of the date the ROD
is issued.7 0 The ARARs may be
changed after that date, but only if
the EPA finds that "new standards
are necessary to ensure that the
remedy is protective of human
health and the environment."' 7'
This regulatory requirement was
included in the Consent Decree and
Thermal Treatment Workplan, along
with the parties' agreement that
Syntex apply for County air and
pollution permits. 7 2
The court stated that the
EPA's policy for "freezing" ARARs
If the
is based on efficiency."'7
ARARs were not given a measure
of consistency, the EPA would
constantly be modifying the remedies and standards in light of new
or different requirements.17 4 Consequently, such an outcome would
slow the clean-up operation and
defeat Congress's mandate of
quick, effective clean-up of hazardous sites.s75
The District Court found
that the EPA was not required to
adhere to the County's stricter
standard.'76 Pursuant to its research,
the EPA determined the appropriate
standards, and there was no

Dioxin Litigation
evidence outside the County's an intent by the parties to modify or
ordinance and claims which indi- waive federal law regarding ARARs
cated the EPA's determination was being frozen on the date of the
inaccurate."' The Court concluded ROD.' 84 The agreement did not
that the EPA knew of the County's grant the County power to modify
more restrictive standard but elected the ARARs, which were fixed when
to ignore that standard in the Final the ROD was issued.8 5 The only
Permit.I" In fact, by excluding the means of modifying the ARARs
stricter standard, the EPA implicitly was to convince the EPA that an
rejected it as necessary for the alteration was necessary for human
protection of human health and the health and the environment.' 86
environment.' 9
The Court concluded by
The County argued that, noting that the County could have
despite federal law operating to asked Missouri to request a higher
freeze the ARAR's on the date the standard regarding dioxin emisROD is issued, the Consent Decree sions in 1988 when the ROD and
reserved the County's right to ARARs were being issued.'
The
impose stricter dioxin standards County knew of the project, yet
after the ROD was issued in waited some seven years to amend
September, 1988.1so The Court the ordinance, long after the
found that the Thermal Treatment standards had been established.'88
Workplan included a limited agree- The Circuit Court found that the
ment by the parties that Syntex County's higher air pollution "stanwould apply for County air emis- dards were insufficient to overcome
sion permits.' 8'
However, that the clear federal law" on this
agreement specifically mentioned issue.'8 9 The Court held that the
only conventional pollutants, which County's ordinance regarding didoes not include dioxin.'8 2 The oxin emissions was inapplicable to
Court implied that the provision the Times Beach project because
could have received broader treat- once the EPA published ARARs
ment, but in light of the County's and the ROD, they became federal
heavy, unexpected reliance, the law, and thus, preempted inconsisCourt felt compelled to limit the tent local law.' 9
provision to its literal interpretation.'
V.
COMMENT
The Court also found
This case offers an interestnothing in the workplans to indicate ing perspective on the struggle

between the patriarchal federal
government and the narrowly interWho
ested local governments.
should decide what level of
protection is sufficient for families
living and working near Times
Beach, Missouri? On the one hand,
the federal government possesses
nearly endless experience, knowledge and resources. However, local
governments are comprised of the
citizens who will be left behind after
the clean-up is over. Would the
experts in the EPA issue the same
ARARs if their children were
attending nearby Eureka High
School? This note does not suggest
that the federal government is not
equally concerned with the safety of
Americans throughout the country.
The issue involves comparing the
ability and interest of government
officials with the interests of Joe Q.
Public in the resolution of environmental contamination.
The instant decision is
rather unique, in that very few cases
have involved ordinances on the
county or municipal level conflicting with federal CERCLA operations.' 9' There is, however, a great
body of precedent concerning
preemption questions between state
law and federal law.'" The Witco
case offers the relatively rare
situation of a state law preempting a
CERCLA provision.'19 This result

'77jd

1'Id.
179fd

' Id.
1'1Id.
2Id2
183

Id.

'8 Id. at 162-63.

'" Id. at 163.

89

1 Id.

" See City and County ofDenver, 100 F.3d 1509; Idvlwoods Associates, 915 F. Supp. 1290; ChathamSteel Corp., 858 F. Supp. 1130.
9

Id.

"I Witco, 822 F. Supp. at 1084.
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will generally be limited to issues
involving profound state interest or
public policy concerns. The instant
decision clearly stays within the
realm of environmental law dominated by federal legislation, and
thus, the state law is preempted.' 94
Express preemption obviously leaves nothing for the courts
to decide. In terms of implied
preemption, the District Court in
Witco offered two relevant inquiries, both of which resolve conflicts
by preempting the state law.' 9s With
exceptional situations such as the
one in Witco, courts have found that
a state's compelling interest in an
area of law warrants denying
preemption for a relatively weak
federal interest.' 9
The policy underlying the
EPA's decisions are derived primarily from CERCLA. While forcing
responsible parties to bear the cost
of remedial action, the EPA must
also refrain from excessive clean-up
costs.' 9 Therefore, the EPA's goal
is to apply the quickest, most
efficient, most reasonable means of
remediation at Superfund sites.'"
On the other hand, the
County's policy is also compelling.

Its constituents living in the County
fear the adverse effects an illconceived clean-up effort could
produce.'"
Consequently, the
County has an incentive to seek a
more restrictive standard for these
chemical emissions. In cases like
these, where the local government
cannot represent the people's interests, the citizens are not simply
bereft of alternatives. The citizens
can utilize public participation. 2 00
As a threshold matter, it is
important to distinguish between
"citizen suits" and "public participation" under CERCLA. 20' For a
citizen suit, a plaintiff files a civil
suit in a district court against any
potentially responsible person or
governmental entity (to the extent
permitted under the lI1 Amendment to the United States Constitution), alleging the person or
governmental entity violated "any
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order which has
become effective pursuant to this
chapter. "202
A second form of
citizen suit entails filing a complaint
against the President or any other
officer of the United States. 203 The
complaining party alleges a failure

to perform any act or duty under this
chapter which is not at that person's

discretion. 20 4
Those avenues consume
both time and resources. Public
participation differs from citizen
suits, in that it does not involve a
legal action. 2 0s Public participation
is the means by which citizens living
in and around the contaminated site
can join in the study and selection of
an appropriate remedy. 2 *
There are numerous public
policies served by encouraging and
facilitating public participation.
Community empowerment is one
benefit offered by public participation. 207
When a community
discovers it has become a hazardous
waste site, the sense of impotence
can be mitigated by allowing the
people to provide input on the
decision. 20 Direct public involvement helps ease the community's
feelings of helplessness. 209
A second policy advanced
is legitimacy. 2 0 The Superfund has
not enjoyed overwhelming success
in its clean-up efforts, and this has
led to distrust. 211 In addition, the
government has demonstrated no
ability to prevent hazardous waste

See Independent Petrochemical Corp., 104 F.3d at 159.
Witco, 822 F. Supp at 1088. As discussed in the legal background supra, the two inquiries are, (1) Is it possible to comply with both

'
'"

statutes?, and (2)Does the state [Delaware non-claim] statute stand as an obstacle to Congressional intent? Id.; see supra text accompanying
note 117.
'" Witco, 822 F. Supp at 1089. The Witco Court declared prior to finding implicit federal preemption, "courts must consider the federal
scheme oflegislation, the role ofthe states in that scheme, and whether the field oflegislation is one in which the federal interest is so dominant
that it precludes enforcement ofstate laws on the subject" Id. Thus, where state law has traditionally dominated a field of law, courts should

be particularly reluctant to find preemption. Id.
" 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (1995).
55 Fed. Reg. 8814.
'"Independent Petrochemical Corp., 104 F.3d at 161.

20042

U.S.C. § 9617(1995).
§ 9659(a) (1995).

142 U.S.C.
2

Id.
Id.

203

4 Id.

- 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (1995).
2o Id.
I
20

Ellison Folk, Public Participation in the Supesfund Cleanup Process, 18 ECOLoGY L.Q. 173, 181 (1991).

2

Id. at 182.
Id. at 179.

8 Id.

210
211

Id.
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contamination, and this further
damages the public perception of
the government's ability to clean up
hazardous sites.212 This situation is
aggravated by the appearance of
impropriety attending the close
cooperation between the government and the perceived enemy, the
potentially responsible party(s). 213
Public participation addresses these
problems, in that studies have
shown people are generally more
willing to accept decisions in which
they have contributed. 214 While
citizens cannot participate in ways
unavailable under CERCLA, such
as attempting to intervene in
decisions on the submission of
Consent Decrees and enacting
more stringent regulations on a
local level, citizens can exert
considerable influence on the remedy selection.
In the absence of public
participation, the EPA and its
experts generally tend to make
adequate remedial decisions, and
Times Beach is no exception.
While sympathizing with the motive of the County and its citizens,
the EPA's standard is probably
more than sufficient. The standard
creates a one in a million risk of the
most heavily exposed person developing cancer. 215
In fact, the
National Contingency Plan does not
212
213

permit the EPA to set a more policies.
stringent standard at a Superfund
This decision sends a clear
project.216 The federal government message to municipal, county and
does not want to jeopardize state governments. If those govemAmerican lives.
The EPA's mental entities wish to be heard on
primary concern seems to be the remediation issues, the federal
effective remediation of Superfund government would be pleased to
sites without requiring the respon- hear from them. If those governsible parties to pay huge amounts to mental entities remain silent, though,
alleviate the illogical anxiety which the federal government will jump in
consumes local communities. 2 "
with both feet and orchestrate the
The instant decision is whole clean-up. There are only two
based primarily on the idea that requirements for the local governCERCLA and Congress mandate ments to assert their interests in the
expeditious clean-up of hazardous remedial action plan. First, the local
sites.21' Evidence of this policy can governments must follow CERCLA
be found in section 113 of protocol and petition the state
CERCLA, which precludes judicial government to express their conreview of an EPA remedial order cerns.
Second, the state must
until after the remedy has been provide all its input before the EPA
completed.21 9 The logic supporting determines ARARs and publishes a
this holding is that damage to the ROD. 22 1 Requiring less would
environment cannot be enjoined by defeat the most integral of CERCLA
a court while litigation is pending. policies.
The state can influence the decisions regarding remediation under VI.
CONCLUSION
section 121 of CERCLA as
As early as 1982, the EPA
discussed supra, and local govern- had initiated a response program
ments can express their concerns designed at reducing the contaminathrough the state's channels.220 tion at Times Beach and the other
Thus, once an appropriate, not sites in eastern Missouri. 22 2 The
perfect, remedy has been found and whole incident enjoyed tremendous
approved, the issue should be put to media coverage, especially the
rest. The Court does not want to evacuation ofthe residents of Times
open a new avenue of litigation Beach. 2 23 The County must have
which would interfere with these been aware that a clean-up opera-

d

1Id.
"I Id. at 180.
...
Independent PetrochemicalCorp., 104 F.3d. at 161.
216

Id.

A recent news article stated that blood tests had revealed that during the first four months of the incinerator's operation in Times Beach,
the average dioxin concentration in the residents living near the facility had dropped from 1.81 to 1.24 parts per million. Blood Tests Reveal
Times Beach bncineratoris Relatively Safe So Far,West's Legal News, 1996 WL 649533.
21

55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8757 (1990).
21942 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(1995).
21

22.Independent PetrochemicalCorp.,

104 F.3d at 163.
arguments could be made that efficiency suggests removing the intermediary and the state, and allowing the local governments to
petition the EPA directly. While that may make sense in some or even most cases, such an approach would prove detrimental ifmultiple
governmental entities offered differing perspectives. The administrative costs, in both time and money, could be tremendous. Considering
the state's fiduciary duty to the local governments within its borders, the superior approach would seem to be to allow all interested
government entities to present their viewpoints to the state, which could sort out the arguments and then provide the EPA with a
comprehensive representation of local concerns.
222
See Bliss 1, 667 F. Supp. 1298.
2
1 See Bliss II, 132 F.R.D. 58.
221Note,
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tion would eventually take place.
At that time, the County should
have begun contemplating what
safety standards would be necessary
to protect the health and welfare of
its citizens, and then conveyed those
beliefs to the Missouri government.
Instead, the County was content to
watch the federal goverrnent
clean-up the Superfund site with no
mention of the proposed remedial
plan. The Court responded by
choosing to perpetuate CERCLA's
policies of swift and efficient cleanup by dismissing the County's
amended ordinance as a preempted
speed bump on the Superfund road
to remedial relief for Times Beach.

FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL ONLINE SOURCES
EPA HOME PAGE
http://www.epa.gov/epahome/index.html
EPA CIVIL CASES AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
http://www.rtk.net/www/data/docgen.html
EPA PERMIT CONTROL SYSTEM FOR WATER PERMITS
http://wwvw.rtk.net/wvww/data/pcsgen.html
EPA ACCIDENTAL RELEASE INFORMATION PROGRAM
http://www.rtk.net/www/data/aripgen.htmi
CERCLA SUPERFUND INFORMATION SYSTEMS
http://www.rtk.net/www/data/cer-html
U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE HOME PAGE
http://www.fws.gov/fwshomep.htnl
U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE ENDANGERED SPECIES
HOME PAGE
http://www.fws.gov/-r9endspp/enspp.html
NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM HOME PAGE
http:/Ibluegoose.arw.r9.fws.gov/NWRSFiles/Welcome.html

MISSOURI GOVERNMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL SOURCES ONLINE
*
*
*
*
*
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Missouri State Government Home Page
http://www.state.mo.us
Missouri Department of Conservation Home Page
http://www.state.mo.us/conservation
Missouri Department of Natural Resources Home Page
http://www.state.mo.us/dnr/homednr.htm
Missouri Department of Health Home Page
http://www.health.state.mo.us
Missouri Department of Public Safety Home Page
http://wwwv.dps.state.mo.us

